Formation of Sensibility in Mother-Child Relation : Temporal Dephasing and Traumatic Displacement. by Poleshchuk, Irina
Title
Formation of Sensibility in Mother-Child
Relation : Temporal Dephasing and Traumatic
Displacement.
Author(s) Poleshchuk, Irina







Osaka University Knowledge Archive : OUKA
https://ir.library.osaka-u.ac.jp/repo/ouka/all/
Osaka University
	 19  
 
64 
Formation of Sensibility in Mother 




Maternity and temporality 
 
Being well known as a philosopher of radical responsibility for the 
other Levinas develops a model of intersubjective relation and its ethical 
temporality on the example of maternity. The mother-child relation is 
described as a prototype of intersubjective relation, it is one-for-the-other 
and other-in-the-same, i.e., being already affected by the other.  Maternal 
subjectivity is unconditionally responsibility for the other, it is disclosed not 
only as a metaphor to portray radicality of responsibility for the other but 
also as a modality of ethical becoming.  This ethical becoming has a 
particular structure of temporality: subjectivity is the one-for-the-other at 
the very moment of the present but also is already for the other in the future, 
i.e., the futurity of responsibility is penetrating the present.  
The ethical becoming is rooted first of all in sensibility, which has, 
according Levinas’s interpretation, intriguing features: taking various 
interchangeable shapes it involves exposure, vulnerability, trauma but also 
welcome and care. The maternal sensible embodiment shows that sensibility 
has a double structure based on auto-affectivity and hetero-affectivity. The 
hetero-affective sensibility is initiated by the other penetrating subjectivity 
at the level senses: mother reacts on child’s needs, illness, pain or death. The 
address of the other expels subjectivity depriving it from its locus thought as 
enjoyment and ‘furnishment of needs’, it is “no longer dwelling, not stomping 
any ground” (Levinas, 2006, 49).  This is a displacement of the embodied 
self, of the self as auto-affectivity and as affectivity of life itself might also 
question the validity of intersubjective temporality of mother-child relation. 
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I believe that maternity is not only a form and a manifestation of radical 
responsibility, but also traumatic bias and temporal dephazing which 
describe a transformation of sensibility.   
 
Let me start with developing Levinas’s original view on formation of 
ethical temporality. The main focus of Levinas’s work Time and the Other is 
how to preserve subjectivity in transcendence and, at the same time, not to 
reduce the alterity of the other: “How can the ego that I am remain myself 
in a you, without being nonetheless the ego that I am in my present – that 
is to say, an ego that inevitably returns to itself? How can the ego become 
other to itself?” (Levinas, 1985, 91). This question has a very explicit 
temporal dimension. I reformulate it as the following: how to keep the ethical 
meaning of the presence of the future in the present and not reduce it to the 
solitary life of subjectivity?  The answer is that subjectivity finds this 
particular modality in maternal relation.  
The birth of a child breaks the time of subjectivity as continuity. 
Levinas argues that the future of the child is “my own and non-mine, a 
possibility of myself but also a possibility of the other” (Levinas, 2004, 267). 
In fecundity, given as a relation to the future, subjectivity can be saved from 
the endless repetition of oneself and from being attached to oneself. (Levinas, 
1985, 92) But also in fecundity I find a birth of the other who is not mine and 
who avoids any possession because in a child I go beyond the fulfillment of 
all the possibilities of my own ego. The child as a result of the erotic situation 
appears to be a specific locus of transcendence, where subjectivity while 
preserving itself is given the possibility of not inevitably returning to itself.  
The relationship with a child establishes an “absolute future”: a child 
is not a replication of the identical, because in the case of repetition the 
alterity of the other is totally neutralized. In fecundity it is preserved. 
Because of infinite time, the subject transcends death through the 
discontinuity of its transcendence to others. This peculiar modification of 
	 19  
 
66 
temporality is not, however, an attempt to reclaim lost opportunities, it is 
not to be in “search of lost time”.  It is rather the only possible actualization 
of responsibility. The identical in this case is opposed to the true future — 
the future that is beyond the limits of its own predetermination.  
We do not really encounter the term of the maternal subjectivity 
Levinas’s texts, however, in Otherwise than Being of Beyond the Essence he 
speaks about maternity as sensibility found inside subjectivity. There is 
complicated logic of alteration between immanence and transcendence 
manifested as the other within subjectivity revealed as maternity: “it is being 
torn up from oneself, being less than nothing, a rejection into negative, 
behind nothingness; it is maternity, gestation of the other in the same” 
(Levinas, 2006, 75). In other words, starting from discussion of the erotic 
relation (where auto-affective sensibility can still hold its strong locus) in 
Totality and Infinity Levinas moves to ethical modality of maternal 
subjectivity. He writes, “sensibility is being affected by a non-phenomenon, 
a being put in question by the alterity of the other, before the intervention of 
a cause, before the appearing of the other” (Levinas, 2006, 75). Here the 
accent is put on the immediacy of body sensation which exposes one to the 
signifying of the other as the-other-in-the-same. The-other-in-the-same 
means that “the subject is affected without the source of the affection 
becoming a theme of representation” (Levinas, 2006, 75). Maternity, as 
passing between being and transcendence, expresses a being affected by the 
other without having a source, and it is also structured as the-other-in-the-
same. (Levinas, 2006, 78) Let me elaborate this argument.  
In maternity female subjectivity acquires its interpretation as a 
temporalizing body and discovers a pre-ontological past: because the birth of 
a child and an appeal of a child break temporal continuity of subjectivity and 
affect subjectivity before it is aware of being responsible.  
“The subjectivity of flesh and blood in matter – the 
signifyingness of the sensible, the-one-for-the-other itself – is 
	 19  
 
67 
the preoriginal signifyingness that gives sense, because it gives. 
Not because, as preoriginal, it would be more original than the 
origin, but because the diachrony of sensibility, which cannot be 
assembled in a representational present, refers to an 
irrecuperable pre-ontological past, that is of maternity” 
(Levinas, 2006, 78)  
Subjectivity as one-for-the-other is born only in maternity, meaning 
deposing itself, a deposing which, according to Levinas, is the very possibility 
of giving. This giving could be described as a gift of my body, my food and 
clothes to the other before I have been born as a sensible subject, even before 
my free will and without the possibility of being together since the other has 
already marked me inside.   
Thus, maternity means also welcome. I claim that in maternity 
subjectivity already anticipates the appeal of the other which has not yet 
come. My argument differs form Levinas’s which claims, as in the quotation 
above, that maternity bears a sense of a pre-ontological past.  Maternity 
gives also a new look on the future. I am welcoming the other by giving food, 
clothes and my body: “sensible experience as an obsession by the other, or a 
maternity, is already corporeality. …The corporeality of one’s own body 
signifies, as sensibility itself, a knot or a denouement of being. … one-for-
the-other, which signifies in giving, when giving offers not the superfluxion 
of the superfluous, but the bread taken from one’s mouth. Signification 
signifies, consequently, in nourishing, clothing, lodging, in maternal relation, 
in which matter shows itself for the first time in its materiality” (Levinas, 
2006, 77). The gesture of giving signifies here a move towards the future but 
the act itself of giving is formed as the present. I am giving my food to the 
other at the moment of now, but still, the origin of present and future is in 
the other.  
The mother-child relation is based on the sensible expressed in 
sensibility, but it also goes beyond the sensible. In Levinas’s reading of 
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sensibility in intersubjective relation the sense bestowal is coming from 
outside. The transcendental character of sensibility is structurally 
determined by the moment of contact with alterity of the child. The profound 
nuance that Levinas is at pains to point out is that the contact itself should 
not be read as the consciousness of contact, but rather subjectivity is 
subordinated to that with which it is in contact. Thus, Levinas’s innovative 
reading of sensibility tends to see sensibility as alterity, which facilitates our 
openness to exteriority. The innovation of Levinas’s analysis of sensibility is 
rooted in its openness to alterity happening in maternal relation. His goal is 
to maintain otherness within the structure of sensibility. However, this 
openness involves being vulnerable: sensible being is also simply dependent 
being, being vulnerable in its sensibility, because in openness to the world 
and together with enjoyment, subjectivity also experiences pain and 
suffering, and hence it cares for its own protection in the world. This analysis 
of sensibility fundamentally problematizes subjectivity. Incarnated sensible 
subjectivity also has the possibility of signification in the sense of donation. 
However, this ethical gesture takes a radical form of irreversibility of 
responsibility. Levinas argues that “the ego in itself like one is in one’s skin, 
that is to say, cramped, ill at ease in one’s skin, as though the identity of 
matter weighing on itself concealed a dimension allowing a withdrawal this 
side of immediate coincidence” (Levinas, 1996, 86). To escape this coincidence 
with its ipseity, the subjectivity has to move from the modality of “being-in-
one’s-skin” to “having-the-other-under-one’s-skin.”1 “Having-the-other-
under-one’s-skin” conditions the constitution of ethical sensibility, which 
leads directly to the non-coincidence with oneself.  Here, the initial 
displacement of the intentional consciousness is rooted in the embodied 
sensibility: “in the form of corporeality, whose movements are fatigue and 
whose duration is ageing, the passivity of signification, of the one-for-another 
is not an act, but patience, that is, of itself sensibility or imminence of pain” 
(Levinas, 2006, 55).  
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The category of maternity got a different interpretation than the 
temporal one. Furthermore, maternity is described as the archetype of 
nourishment, i.e. a synthesis of the mother and the earth as providers of 
feeding.2 There is also another crucial question which I would like just to 
mention. The metaphor of maternity reveals also the mother-child relation 
which is different from the father-child relation. In the father-child relation 
subjectivity both remains itself and becomes other than itself: “Paternity is 
the relationship with a stranger who, entirely while being Other, is myself, 
the relationship of the ego with a myself who is nonetheless a stranger to me” 
(Levinas, 2004, 91). The male creates something outside of himself, 
something “other” that will outline his own mortal body without making an 
immediate claim on his autonomy. Yet, in the mother-child relation the child 
belongs to the substance of the mother and it is of the mother. There is a 
sharing of substance that finally leads to total substitution: in feeding the 
mother gives herself to the child; it is one-for-the-other without keeping the 
same but also torn inside out and displaced in the radicality of substitution. 
Here the traumatic modality is more visible than in paternity since the very 
core of sensibility as auto-affectivity is involved. 
The general structure of the experience of maternity is built up upon 
a tension arising between auto-affectivity, self-awareness and disrupted 
temporal continuity grasped in memories and projections. This tension can 
be expressed in language emphasizing eventually a meaning of ethical 
becoming of subjectivity. Maternity thus seems to bring subjectivity to the 
very limits of rationality, language and self-consciousness. In Otherwise 
than Being Levinas makes an interesting turn to the theme of the feminine, 
maternity and language. Maternity becomes appropriate for the signifying 
of the sense - “bearing par excellence” (Levinas, 2006, 75). Here I find a 
remarkable change in the reading of the feminine – it is revealed as the 
signifying par excellence of alterity, of subjectivity and of the saying.  
Describing the feminine as the-other-in-the-same Levinas discovers the 
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ethical saying in the core of the said: “But the saying extended toward the 
said received this tension from the other, who forces me to speak before 
appearing to me. The saying extended towards the said is a being obsessed 
by the other, a sensibility which the other by vocation calls upon and where 
no escaping is possible” (Levinas, 2006, 77). Before the other appeals to me I 
am already forced to answer, because in maternity subjectivity is disclosed 
as being obsessed by the other and being a hostage of the other.  
Giving, welcoming and deposing oneself are linked to the saying 
within the said. Let me also add that maternity as subjectivity in absolute 
exposedness to the other (to the child) is described by Levinas as speaking 
to/for (Levinas, 2006, 92). It is a form of an ethical language the essence of 
which consists in being silent and offering that silence as a gift for the other 
and as being-for-the-other. This silent speaking is a fundamental passivity 
that again indicates a non-intentional state of consciousness: “this passivity 
is the way opposed to the imperialism of consciousness open to the world” 
(Levinas, 2006, 92). 
 
Maternity, sensibility and dephasing 
 
What we don’t see behind Levinas’s exposition of temporal structure 
of paternal relation as a radical form of responsibility is phenomenology of 
pregnancy and gestation, which reveal the intensity of vulnerability in 
maternal embodiment.  
What is ‘how’ of subjectivity before it enters into mother-child 
relation? Following Levinas’s description subjectivity is perceived as the one 
who dwells, enjoys, and builds its life on eating and furnishing, who is ‘living 
from the world’. In forms of dwelling and in “living from”, but also in such 
existential modalities as at enjoying and bathing in the world, self-affected 
subjectivity is already determined as being here and as an embodiment, 
which unfolds itself exactly in the present and it is possessing the very 
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continuity of the present. In this phenomenological description of 
subjectivity proposed by Levinas I find a particular temporality deploying as 
the being here of the body, and sketching its static character: subjectivity 
constantly tends to localize itself as a center and as a privileged locus, which 
is the way of how the body experiences to be at home (chez soi) and in the 
world. Therefore, the self-affecting subject is a pure present, a temporal 
punctum and a center in terms of space and time. In holding its locus, the 
self-affecting subjectivity is heading towards a temporal synchronization 
that soothe its interiorized habitation. The emphasis here is on auto-
affection as the continuity of the self ’s inner-time and as a projective-
retentive temporalization of its being-in-the-world. The self-affected 
subjectivity naturally wants to return to the self, to be able to hold the core 
of the self and to preserve it as an identity.  To leave its ecstatic and 
sometimes disturbing existence self-affecting subjectivity needs a refuge, a 
possibility of withdrawal, or a retreat into the locus. However, this auto-
affective sensibility and this comforted embodied dwelling are displaced in 
gestation, pregnancy and maternity. Maternal subjectivity is foremost 
dephasing: neither in phase with its own affectivity, nor for the self and by 
the self. Dephasing, brought by gestation and pregnancy, can contribute to a 
description of a specific form of ethical intersubjective temporality, which has 
complex framework of intertwined “slices” of time invading subjectivity. Let 
me examine this thesis in a more detailed way. 
The very general structure of women’s experience of pregnancy and 
maternity might be described as a transitional process towards the unknown. 
The continuity of temporal move is constantly disturbed: the awareness of 
the past and the moment of the present are not necessarily connected and 
projected, in an expected way, on the future which is still to come.  This 
includes travelling from the past through the present toward the unknown 
future. In the modi of gestation, pregnancy and maternity hetero affection is 
shaped by the alterity of the child, which becomes a primary clue for the 
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constitution of time. Subjectivity is affected not only by representations and 
immanent affection (‘affection de soi par soi’) but also by the other 
inseparable from maternal subjectivity, i.e. by “the-other-in-the-same”. Thus, 
the dialectic relation between continuity and discontinuity, between 
synchronized present and diachrony comes into play.  
In the context of phenomenology the fascinating side of pregnancy and 
maternity shows that subjectivity does not possess the intentioned object 
and is not able to manipulate it. In process of gestation the child is not mine 
in a complete comprehensive way and is not available for consciousness. 
Being a kind of ‘in-between” phenomenon pregnancy is inwrought between 
physical manifestation, cognitive and existential experiences. Here, 
sensibility of maternal subjectivity takes a different shape. In paternity - 
father-child relation - the future of the child is the future of a stranger or of 
the radical other. The danger is that the child still might be conceived as an 
object of representation. In father-child relation the singularity of paternal 
subjectivity is preserved while inside maternal subjectivity this singularity 
is disturbed and shifted. But for maternal subjectivity the condition is rather 
different: the child, whom she is expecting, will never be an object for 
consciousness but only as the other (because it is also of-the-mother), whose 
possibilities exceed what can be grasped in terms of her own.  
Following Levinas’s description “the sensible-maternity, vulnerability, 
apprehension – binds the mode of incarnation into a plot larger than the 
apperception of the self”. He argues that in the mode of maternity “I am 
bound to Others before being tied to my body” (Levinas, 2006, 76). In 
pregnancy mother-child relation has a peculiar structure: the child is felt as 
a stranger, however, for the expecting mother the child is a ‘’familiar 
stranger”, who is both of the mother and in oneself. In Totality and Infinity 
Levinas develops the metaphor of maternity as an example of radical 
responsibility for the other to reformulate a meaning of transcendence. 
(Levinas, 2004, 267-269) Being a constant “growing up” maternity is felt as 
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a genesis of “experience” and is determined as a phenomenon that befalls 
subjectivity before it is fully aware of it. Sensibility enters into 
intersubjective field thanks to the ethical draw of the child. However, this 
appeal of the child might also dissociate the sense of self-conformity and 
challenges the assumption that subjectivity is always singular. The unique 
experience of maternity, its vulnerability, is marked by the anarchic, pre-
original touch of the other, which would be otherwise lost in other types of 
intersubjective relations. Thus, the relation between sensible subjectivity 
and the child arrive at the high level of vitality because in different senses 
and in different expressions the structure of embodiment consists at once of 
the mother’s and of the child’s and therefore singularity of subjectivity is 
tuned into intersubjective sensibility.  
This brings up the further consideration that maternal relation with 
the child is going beyond any relation between two equal concepts of two 
subjects, rather this relation is rooted inside subjectivity and it aims at the 
constitution of ethical becoming of subjectivity. Subjectivity is extending 
itself into temporality other than its own continuity. To have a child does not 
literally mean to reproduce but to give birth to diachronical temporality, to 
the future which is not fully mine but which invades my present. Subjectivity 
is in a way split by the future that the child will open and develop. Many 
feminists continue to see the pregnancy not only as a “split subjectivity” but 
a certain mode of sensibility in-between. This split is a diachronical rupture; 
it is the future, which is not yet there, however, it establishes a link to ethical 
temporality. 
In “Gender and Anonymous Temporality” Silvia Stiller writes, “it is 
due to a woman’s awareness of pregnancy that they hold another gender-
specific time experience. The pregnant woman experiences carrying 
somebody in her body for nine months, waiting for the birth of her child, 
being patient, continually recognizing the changes in and of her body, the 
growth of her child, living an intense double life for a certain time period. 
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(….) Women do indeed have a specific sense of temporality due to their 
female bodies” (Stiller, 2011, 80). The auto-affective subjectivity is no longer 
in continuity of the present, it is no longer dwelling at its locus but it is a 
hetero-affectivity in a mere transit phase of waiting for. This split of 
temporality implies a common ontological ambiguity that is inherent to all 
human conditions – alienation and freedom, immanence and transcendence, 
singularity and intersubjectivity, the one and the other.  
In a more dynamic approach to the problem of maternal subjectivity 
Iris Marion Young notes: “The pregnant subject, I suggest, is decentered, 
split, or doubled, in several ways. She experiences her body as herself and 
not herself. Its inner movements belong to another being, yet they are not 
other, because her bodily boundaries shift and because her bodily self-
location is focused on her trunk in addition to her head. (….) Pregnancy, I 
argue, reveals a paradigm of bodily experience in which the transparent 
unity of self dissolves” (Young, 2005, 46f).  
Young offers the vision of pregnancy as transitional modality of “in-
between”. It is also a new mode of sensible embodiment of “in-between”. The 
subject is not just split but rather diachronical and is in the mode of 
intersubjective “in-between” happening inside constantly transforming 
sensibility.  Julia Kristeva reinforces an image of pregnant subjectivity:  
“Cells fuse, split, and proliferate; volumes, grow, tissues stretch, an body 
fluids change rhythm speeding up or slowing down. Within the body, growing 
as a graft, indomitable, there is an other. And no one is present within that 
simultaneously dual and alien space, to signify what is going on. “It happens, 
but I’m not there.” “I cannot realize it but it goes on. Motherhood’s impossible 
syllogism” (Kristeva, 1982, 237).3 For Kristeva pregnancy is a continuous 
duality where the awareness of being oneself and of being the other 
constantly changes.  
As it was described above in giving birth the horizon of perspective of 
embodied subjectivity and its constitution of temporality are bound to the 
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modes that are not for subjectivity alone to make a choice. In this context 
Beauvoir’s argument comes into play asserting that the birth involves an 
irreducible element of passivity from female subjectivity: “(She is) a 
storehouse of colloids, an incubator, an egg; she scares children who are 
proud of their young, straight bodies and make young people titter 
contemptuously because she is a human being, a conscious and free 
individual who has become life’s passive instrument” (Beauvoir, 1956, 477). 
This passivity meant that pregnancy and maternity are bound to immanence 
of material presence because their biological bodies are becoming confined 
boxes where possibility to escape and to free oneself is very little. However, 
I believe that there is a kind of dynamism present in unfolding maternal 
body. The formation of gestation refers to such structure of temporality that 
precedes an origin of time rooted in existence of maternal subjectivity. The 
growth of the child’s gestation in the body of a woman comes before an 
awareness of one’s maternal existence as belonging to oneself. In The Gift of 
the Other: Levinas and the Politics of Reproduction Lisa Guenther fuses an 
concept of pregnancy as extreme vulnerability with modality of ethical 
welcoming: “the expectant mother… bears this other who remains a stranger 
despite he bearing, unseen and perhaps even violent: kicking at her ribs, 
altering the shape of her body, shifting her bones from within. She bears this 
weight of the Other for the sake of the Other in this bearing, she becomes 
responsible for the child, for the child’s responsibility, and even for the pain 
that the child inflicts” (Guenther, 2006, 211).  
I still want to articulate a complexity of vulnerability of maternal 
embodiment. Before the child exists as the temporal continuum, i.e. as the 
present grasped in the world she or he already addresses maternal 
subjectivity with demands. Lisa Guenther describes it in a very physiological 
way – child is kicking, squeezing and pressing against ribs of its mother. The 
child is not only depending on maternal subjectivity but it also conquers her 
body by creating space for its own existence within her body. By consuming 
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and destroying mother’s body the child grows and gradually gains its 
independency. Before the child starts to build it existence as a being-in-the-
world it affirms itself through dependency, separation, address, response and 
command. One could already see that these types of relations create anarchic 
conditions for the child’s future existence and establish a radical form of 
responsibility as the one-for-the-other projected into the future.  
There is an important point to stress.  For maternal subjectivity the 
process of gestation marks the immemorial irrecuperable lapse of time that 
prevents subjectivity from prioritizing or imposing one’s own existence. 
Levinas describes it as “a pre-original, not resting on oneself” (Levinas, 2006, 
75). Obviously, gestation disrupts in advance the representation of birth as 
imagined, fixed, chosen or produced, but also gestation crashes the residue 
of the self of subjectivity. Being pregnant the woman is exposed to the other 
whom she has never seen or met in the immediacy of modality of the face-to-
face situation but with whom she finds herself in the ultimate proximity. And 
this is one of the most fascinating move in this anarchic form of 
intersubjective mother-child relation: the face-to-face embodied encounter of 
two, the gestating child and the pregnant woman happens only at the very 
moment of birth, even if they have already been in the closest proximity to 
one another.  
Similar to the function of gestation, in its structure pregnancy refers 
to an anarchic time that cannot be made entirely one’s own; it refers to 
specific form of temporality as being for the other who is not yet-there but 
who is still to come. Temporality of the child precedes temporal continuity of 
the mother, tearing it and creating temporal lapse. Thus, pregnancy is 
experienced as already diachronical because subjectivity exceeds and breaks 
up any continuity with the present grasped as its own. In other words, the 
non-projected future of the child, the future that does not belong to me, but 
for which I am nevertheless responsible brings forth the anarchy of ethical 
life. This anarchy of responsibility initiates a form of dephasing where 
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maternal subjectivity is not coinciding with herself and is shifted from its 
habitual locus. I want to stress here that these disruptions and shifting are 
not the same as alientation, because the body that bears the child is still 
itself but it does not belong to maternal subjectivity as well as it is not 
becoming fully the property of the other. For Levinas being the-one-for-the-
other in proximity is “pure passivity or susceptibility, passive to the point of 
becoming an inspiration, that is, alterity in the same” (Levinas, 2006, 67). 
My argument is that brought by gestation and pregnancy the temporal 
dephasing happening within female embodiment opens up sensibility, which 
is not entirely mine but shared.  
To conclude I would like to advance an idea that in formation of 
maternal sensibility, ethical becoming is not an innate process of the self, nor 
is it a conscious decision to take responsibility for its own actions according 
to ethical norms of behavior. The-other-in-the-same is always more than 
subjectivity can endure. Responsibility befalls the subject with the demand 
“bear me”.  When Levinas says that maternity as a metaphor of ethical 
responsibility is the figure of “bearing par excellence”, he articulates the 
complex meaning of receiving, carrying, sharing, donating, and welcoming 
which are in the anarchy of gestation and birth. Ethical bearing does not 
refer to the present as re-presented but rather to the gift of time. To 
paraphrase Derrida to be responsible is to think time of responsibility as 
donation of my present and of my future, which are not at my possession.  
Even though the donation of time does not belong to the subjectivity in full 
sense, this gift of time happens in intersubjective and shared sensibility of 
the mother-child relation.  The advantage of Levinas’s description of 
maternity is that he attempts to get closer to what takes place in the 
experience of ethical becoming of subjectivity. He widens conceptual 
meaning of temporal structures of sensibility by bringing it from auto-
affective state to hetero-affection and to vulnerability of gestation and 
maternity, and finally, as I believe, to a shared intersubjective sensibility.  
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Notes 
1. Levinas does not explicitly use the phrase “having-the-other-under-one’s-skin”; however, in Otherwise 
than being or beyond the Essence, he describes a traumatic experience of embodied subjectivity being 
marked by and exposed to the other as being turned inside out and as having the other on the other side 
of one’s skin (Levinas, 2006, 48-51). I introduce a modality of “having-the-other-under-one’s-skin” to 
conceptualize the work of affection, which is close to what Levinas uses as the other-in-the-same. 
2. I should also mention a biblical reference in the story of Ruth, which links maternity with 
nourishment and hospitability. This aspect was discussed by Claire Elize Katz in the essay 
“Reinhabiting the House of Ruth” in Feminist interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas. The author 
makes an interesting point in interpreting the feminine: she discloses the woman as formation of 
the ethical I, and as the condition of the ethical. 
3. Kristeva reveals pregnancy as a mean to question social structures and institutions, opening 
horizons to conceptualize varieties of woman’s practices in intersubjective relations. 
 
